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TORTS-PROXIMATE CAUSE-SUPERSEDING CAUSE 
Three defendants, the Standard Oil Company, Parker, their 
lessee, and Powell, a contractor, negligently removed an under-
ground storage tank and allowed a large quantity of gasoline to 
spill and flow on a city street. The fire department was sum-
moned. After the street had been washed, a fireman at the di-
rection of the fire chief touched a lighter to the street to test the 
effectiveness of the washing. The resulting fire damaged plain-
CASENOTES 151 
tiff's automobile. The trial court held Standard, Parker, Powell, 
the fireman and the fire chief liable.1 Upon appeal by defendants 
Standard, Parker and Powell2 to the Supreme Court of Kansas, 
held: Affirmed. The act of the fireman in touching his lighter 
to the pavement was not so unrelated to the negligent spilling of 
the gasoline as to constitute the sole proximate cause of the fire. 
The negligent spilling of the gasoline and the touching of the 
lighter to the pavement were both proximate causes of the fire 
and the damage.3 
It has frequently been recognized that there may be more 
than one proximate cause of an injury.4 In most jurisdictions the 
first wrongdoer, even though his act has merely set the stage on 
which the second wrongdoer contributes to the plaintiff's injury, 
is no longer relieved from liability. The courts argue that the 
second negligent act is merely a means by which the first wrong-
ful act becomes harmful.5 One of the tests in delimiting liability 
in such a case is whether the later negligent act was itself fore-
seeable. 6 Thus, it is generally held that a defendant will not be 
relieved of liability by an intervening force7 which could reason-
ably have been foreseen, or by an intervening force which is a 
normal incident of the risk involved.8 
However, it is a well established principle that the rules 
with respect to proximate cause and substantial factors producing 
1 Demurrers by Standard, Parker and Powell that the petition did not 
disclose facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action were overruled. 
2 Appealed on the grounds that the trial court erred in overruling the 
demurrers in that it must have been concluded as a matter of law that 
any negligence with which they were charged was not the proximate 
cause of the damage sustained and that the proximate cause was the in-
tervening acts of the firemen. 
3 Trapp v. Standard Oil Company, 176 Kan. 39, 269 P.2d 469 (1954). 
4 Waterloo Savings Bank v. Waterloo, Cedar Falls & Northern R.R .. 
60 N.W.2d 572 (Ia. 1953); Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Klass, 217 
Miss. 795, 65 So.2d 575 (1953); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Sutton, 208 
Okl. 488, 257 P.2d 307 (1953). 
5 Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 263 P.2d 287 (Utah 1953); Bohlen, 
Fifty Years of Torts, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 1225, 1229 (1937). 
6 See note 5 supra. 
7 "An intervening force is one which actively operates in producing 
harm to another after the actor's negligent act or omission has been com-
mitted." Restatement, Torts § 441 (1934). 
s Long v. Crystal Refrigerator Co .. 134 Neb. 44, 277 N.W. 830 (1938); 
Nelson v. William H. Ziegler Co., 190 Minn. 313, 251 N.W. 534 (1933); 
l\Iagay v. Clafin-Sumner Coal Co., 257 Mass. 244, 153 N.E. 534 (1926); 
McClure v. Hoopeston Gas and Electric Co., 303 Ill. 89, 135 N.E. 43 
(1922). 
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the harm are liniited by those with respect to superseding9 in-
tervening causes.10 In applying the test of foreseeability to such 
intervening causes, the court in the much quoted case of Kline 
'l'. Moyer11 drew a clear cut distinction between two classes of 
cases. The first situation is where one has negligently created a 
dangerous condition and a later actor becomes aware of the dan-
gerous condition but negligently fails to avoid it. The second 
situation involves conduct of a later intervening actor who negli-
gently fails to observe the dangerous condition until it is too 
late to avoid it. The original actor is relieved of liability in the 
first situation but held liable in the second. The reasoning in the 
first situation is that it is not reasonably to be foreseen that one 
who actually becomes cognizant of a dangerous condition in ample 
time to avert injury will fail to do so. This rule has been followed 
in many jurisdictions12 and is in accord with the Restatement.13 
In the instant case the original actors knew that they had 
been negligent in allowing the gasoline to spill and that someone 
9 "A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which 
by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to an-
other which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing 
about." Restatement, Torts § 440 (1934). 
10 Medved v. Doolittle, 220 Minn. 352, 19 N.W.2d 788 (1945). 
11325 Pa. 357, 191 Atl. 43 (1937). 
12 Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 263 P.2d 287 (Utah 1953); Zelo-
szewski v. Sloan, 375 Pa. 360, 100 A.2d 480 (1953); Edgerton v. Norfolk 
Southern Bus Corp., 187 Va. 642, 47 S.E.2d 409 (1948); Medved v. Doo-
little, 220 l\Iinn. 352, 19 N.W.2d 788 (1945); Johnson v. Cone, 112 Vt. 
459, 28 A.2d 384 (1942). 
13 In a footnote in Kline v. Moyer it was pointed out that the conduct 
was "extraordinarily negligent" within the rule laid down in Restatement, 
Torts § 447c (1934), which provides that, "The fact that an intervening 
act of a third person is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent man-
ner does not make it a superseding cause of harm to another which the 
actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about, if ..• 
the intervening act is a normal response to a situation created by the 
actor's conduct and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily 
negligent." And in comment e of § 447, the Restatement continues. "The 
words extraordinarily negligent denote the fact that men of ordinary ex-
perience and reasonable judgment, looking at the matter after the event 
and taking into account the prevalence of that 'occasional negligence, which 
is one of the incidents of human life,'. would not regard it as extraordinary 
that the third person's intervening act should have been done in the neg-
ligent manner in which it was done. Since the third person's action is a 
product of the actor's negligent conduct, there is good reason for holding 
him responsible for its effects, even though it be done in a negligent 
manner, unless the nature or extent of the negligence is altogether un-
usual.'' 
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might be injured by a resulting fire. Had a pedestrian without 
knowledge of the situation thrown a lighted match into the danger 
area, there would be little doubt as to liability. However, to 
prevent such an injury the original actors summoned an instru-
mentality trained to cope with such a dangerous condition and 
whose duty it was to prevent such an injury. Yet that very in-
strumentality with knowledge of the dangerous condition negli-
gently set the spark which turned the original actor's negligence 
into a blazing inferno. 
Had the original actors not relied upon the training and ex-
perience of the firemen, they no doubt would have taken their 
own corrective measures by guarding the dangerous area. Since 
it is generally agreed that there are at least some limits to the 
tort liability of a negligent defendant and that the law does not 
make a negligent defendant an insurer against every possible 
future contingency, it would appear that the rule adopted in the 
first situation of the Kline case is a reasonable and proper ap-
proach to the rules of superseding causes and one which should 
be applicable to the instant case. 
Marvin L. Holscher, '56 
